In Commonwealth v. Miranda the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion for relief from unlawful restraint. Miranda was convicted of murder in the second degree and other offenses and the SJC affirmed the convictions. Miranda then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, which was stayed in order to give Miranda an opportunity to exhaust state remedies. Miranda then filed a motion for relief from unlawful restraint, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a), which was denied. “At issue in the motion was whether, on direct appeal, the SJC properly applied Commonwealth v. Zanetti, to determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions. In Zanetti, the Court “clarified the legal principles concerning joint venture liability…. In particular, we stated that, in an appeal following a conviction, we will ‘examine whether the evidence is sufficient to permit a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly participated in the commission of the crime charged, with the intent required to commit the crime, rather than examine the sufficiency of the evidence separately as to principal and joint venture liability.’ Miranda argued that this reformulation applies only to cases tried after we decided Zanetti and that our application of it to his case violated ex post facto principles and his due process rights.”
In its decision, the SJC stated, “Since deciding Zanetti, we have made it clear that ‘we apply the principles clarified in Zanetti to claims concerning the sufficiency of the evidence of joint venture, even though the trial preceded that decision.’ …. Moreover, as the Court noted in Zanetti, that decision ‘did not enlarge or diminish the scope of existing joint venture liability,’ but was intended simply ‘to provide clearer guidance to jurors and diminish the risk of juror confusion in cases where two or more persons may have committed criminal acts.’…. Nothing in Zanetti criminalized any action that was lawful when Miranda committed it or deprived Miranda of any previously available defense.” “Finally, even if, as Miranda argued, he was entitled to have the evidence of principal liability and joint venture liability evaluated separately, the outcome would have been no different.” “Even under the pre-Zanetti formulation,” “the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to convict Miranda as either the principal shooter or as a joint venturer.”